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THE ROLE OF THE RATIONAL AND THE 
EMOTIVE IN A THEORY OF ANIMAL 
RIGHTS 
THOMAS G. KELCH* 
This article reviews the law and literature concerning the way that 
we look at rights issues and the foundational principles that are as-
serted to be the predicates of rights in our legal system. Particular at-
tention is paid to problems surrounding the possible extension of le-
gal rights to animals. The analysis reveals that while there are many 
ways of thinking about and grounding rights, most theorists insist 
on asserting that there is some single principle or concept that is the 
foundation for the granting of legal rights. It is argued here that this 
obsessive search for a single explanation for legal rights is folly. In-
stead, rights should be seen as having composite foundations formed 
from many moral, policy, social and cultural supports. It is further 
asserted that among the many things that should have significance 
in determining whether an entity, human or non-human, is a 
rightholder is one that is almost universally ignored in animal rights 
and other rights literature: emotions, and in particular, compassion. 
Emotions, being essential aspects of our nature and of our moral 
lives, are of relevance in determining who should be rightholders. If 
applied to the issue of granting rights to animals, our sense of com-
passion should count as a reason for granting rights to animals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its genesis,l the concept of legal rights has so dilated that 
some lament it has been pushed beyond its appropriate boundaries 
* Thomas G. Kelch is a professor of law at Whittier Law School. The author is much 
indebted to Steven Wise for his insightful COlllments on an earlier draft of this article. The 
author also thanks Golnar Modjtahedi for her invaluable research help on this article. 
1 It is generally thought that the concept of legalloights arose in either the 14th or 17th 
Century, but it has also been argued that this concept originated in the 13th Century. See 
Charles J. Reid, The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical In-
quiry, 33 B.C. L. REv. 37, 37-41 (1991). 
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and no longer has meaning.2 On the other hand, others recognize the 
expansion of legal rights as a natural evolution of social, political, and 
legal structures.3 The possible extension of rights to animals is an ex-
ample of this evolution. To many, however, the idea of "rights" for 
animals seems odd because our ordinary understanding of animals as 
"things" is incommensurable with their having legal rights.4 
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the conceptu-
ally fragmented law and literature concerning the foundations of le-
gal rights, and to propose a way of looking at rights that is favorable to 
the extension of rights to animals. It is not my purpose here to pres-
ent an argument for the existence of animal rights, although I believe 
this result is correct; rather, my purpose is to present a conceptual 
mechanism for analyzing the application of rights to animals. In ac-
complishing this task it is imperative to review not only the animal 
rights literature, but also law and literature relating to human rights, 
since human rights theories are often applied to animals. 
The asserted conceptual foundations of legal rights are manifold. 
Many debate what grounds rights in both the human and animal 
rights arenas, and there are even those who contend that the concept 
of rights should be jettisoned altogether.5 Review of this debate yields 
one obvious conclusion-there is no consensus on the appropriate 
grounding of rights either concerning humans or animals. 
Such a review shows there are a number of theoretical camps 
concerning how rights are grounded.6 There are several theories 
founded on Wesley Hohfeld's famous dichotomous concepts of 
rights/duties and powers/liabilities.7 Others, particularly in the ani-
mal rights area, state that the foundation of rights is the existence of 
"interests" that need protection. Here, rights are granted to those who 
have interests. Rights may also be viewed as founded on a contract 
hypothetically arising from some "original position." They may be the 
2 See L.W. SUMNER. THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 15-18 (Oxford Clarendon 
Press 1987). See also Sowers v. Civil Rights COlllm'n, 252 N.E.2d 463, 474-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1969) (stating "rights" are often too broadly construed, and noting liberties are not .-ights, 
but immunities). 
3 See Ch.-istopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 488 (1972). 
4 See Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution-The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dig-
nity-Rights in a LiberaLDemocracy, 22 VT. L. REv. 793, 833 (1998). 
5 See infra notes 10-26 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra Section II. 
7 See infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text. 
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expression of societal goals. They may just be concepts giving rise to 
certain remedies in our legal system. There are yet other views. 
One common, although not necessarily universal, strand in these 
myriad theories is to assert that there is one foundation for the con-
cept of rights. In other words, one specifiable sort of thing or set of 
things constitutes the ground on which the profusion of rights lies. 
This article contends that this obsessive search for one element or one 
clearly defined set of elements to buttress rights has caused our 
thought to go awry. Instead, properly speaking, legal "rights" have 
multifarious grounds and foundations, not one. Any right can appro-
priately be explained by any number of theories, all of which aid in 
our understanding of the right in question. As such, we may see the 
grounding of rights not as a single solid foundational block, but as 
interwoven webs of numerous conceptual strands. 
This article further asserts that an essential strand in this web that 
is ignored in the law and literature is an emotive element composed 
of sympathy and caring, or more simply, "compassion." Our Western 
analytical, scientific culture abhors such assertions, but our concept of 
rights cannot be fully understood or explained without such an ele-
ment. Emotion is an essential aspect of our nature and our thought, 
and it likewise enters our concept of rights. Moreover, due to, among 
other things, the fact that animals cannot formally assert rights or 
communicate their interests, this emotive aspect plays a more promi-
nent role in considering animal rights issues than in human rights 
concerns. 
I. THE NEED FOR RIGHTS 
"Vhy be concerned with the notion of rights? Legal protection 
may be given to animals without cloaking it in the rhetoric of rights. 
Indeed, utilitarian theory eschews rights for utility calculations.s 
Those enamored of critical legal theory and feminist theory fre-
quently deride rights as tools of repression and the status quo. Those 
taking this tack may, for example, point out that to say one has a right 
does not mean that this right is either enforceable or exercisable.9 To 
8 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 5-8 (2d ed. 1990). 
9 Claims of this Ilatm'e by socialists and feminists are discussed ill Ted Benton, Animal 
Rights: An Eco-Socialist View. in ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE CHANGING DEBATE 19, 19-41 (Robert 
Garner ed., 1996). 
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be meaningful, rights must be positive; there must be an obligation in 
others to respect them and they must be enforceable.I° 
Critical legal studies scholars deride rights by asserting that rights 
merely protect entrenched interests in society.H They choose to ana-
lyze the legal system from a position outside these entrenched views 
that include the concept of rights.12 
Although there is controversy over the usefulness of rights in 
feminist literature,!3 some of this literature views rights as simply part 
of the male way of viewing the world.I4 In this view, rights are a means 
of male domination and exploitation of women, animals, and na-
ture.15 Rights are necessary only because of the competitive and an-
tagonistic system that has been created by male-dominated culture.16 
To socialists, rights are capitalist ploys; those who are disadvan-
taged in the system are accorded certain rights, but these rights are 
not meaningfully exercisable by them, given their position in society.I7 
Rights may only be a pathology of capitalist society resulting from its 
underpinnings of competition and self-interest.I8 Rights are neces-
sary to sort out the inevitable conflicts created by a capitalist system. 
In a more benevolent society, the need for the supposed protection of 
rights might be lessened or non-existent. 19 
Closer to the animal rights issue, Mary Midgley has argued that 
the concept of rights is in conceptual trouble.2o She claims that the 
concept is too ambiguous to be truly useful, and, for this reason, can-
not be effectively utilized.21 
The ambiguity of terms like "right," then, does not just 
express a mistake, but a deep and imperfectly understood 
connection between law and morality. This is why eighteenth-
10 See id. at 32. 
11 SAMUELJ.M. DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS: A BIOPSY OF AMERI-
CAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 38-41 (1994). 
12 See id. at 42. 
13 See Barbara Stark, International Human Rights, Law, Feminist jurisprudence and 
Nietzsches' 'EternalReturn': Turning the Wheel, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 169, 169-75 (1996). 
14 See Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, 15 SIGNS 350, 358-69 
(1990). 
15 See id. 
16 Marti Kheel, Nature and Feminist Sensitivity, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGA-
TIONS 261 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1989) [hereinaftel" Kheel, 1989]. 
17 See Benton, supra note 9, at 33. 
18 See id. at 35. 
19 See id. at 36-37. 
20 See MARY MIDGLEY, ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER 62 (1983). 
21 See id. at 61-64. 
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century revolutionaries were able to exploit these ambigui-
ties with such effect in their campaign for the rights of man. 
Obscure concepts can often be used effectively for reform in 
this way, so long as they are employed only on issues where 
their practical bearing is clear .... The actual word "right," 
however, cannot, as far as I can see, be salvage.d for any clear, 
unambiguous use in this discussion. It can be used in a wide 
sense to draw attention to problems, but not to solve them. 
In its moral sense, it oscillates uncontrollably between appli-
cations which are too wide to resolve conflicts ("the right to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness") and ones which 
are too narrow to be plausible ("the basic human right to 
stay at home on Bank Holiday").22 
5 
Some of the problems with the concept of rights may be found in 
the Western world view.23 Rights may just be an artifact of dualistic 
Western thought.24 The world, in this view, is populated with irulU-
merable dualities, including us/them, subject/object, and right/no-
right.25 This Western world view is also composed of various hierar-
chies that form the structures on which rights hang.26 Without such 
hierarchical structures there might be no need for rights to protect 
one level of the hierarchy from another. Further, the striations of this 
hierarchy can be used to justify denying rights to those at low levels of 
the hierarchy, like animals.27 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, there may be good reason not 
to jettison the concept of legal rights.28 Rights are such an ingrained 
aspect of our legal system that it seems unlikely they could be purged 
without the demolition of the current structure of society. Rights are 
not only deeply set into our legal system, they are a central focus of 
our legal language. As legal structures, rights also serve the mundane 
but useful function of shifting the burden of proof to the entity po-
tentially infringing a right to prove that such infringement is appro-
22 Id. at 62-63. 
23 See Marti Kheel, The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair, in BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
17 (Josephine Donovan & Carol]. Adam eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kheel, 1996]. 
24 See id. at 17-18. 
25 See id. at 18. 
26 See id. at 18-19. 
27 See id. at 21-22. 
28 Benton believes that dghts would be necessary even in a society lacking the sup-
posed scarcity and conflict of capitalist society. See Benton, supra note 9, at 36. 
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priate.29 Moreover, it has been argued that rights are necessary facets 
in the functioning of any human community.30 In such a community 
there are necessarily obligations and entitlements in members of the 
community; these obligations and entitlements are expressed as 
rights. 
We have seen that no one can be a member of a commu-
nity unless there are both tllings which are due from him to 
fellow members and things which are due to him from 
them .... His rights (what he is entitled to as a member) 
consist in all that is due to him; his obligations, of all that is 
due from him. A community consists of its members in the 
sense that, unless there are members there cannot be a 
community. Since to be a member of community is inter alia 
to have rights, without rights there cannot be a community. 
Having rights is a part of human social living in any form, so 
there have to be rights if there is to be any human social life 
at all.31 
It is also difficult to see how some rights fit into the structure of 
oppression described by some critics. While such arguments may 
seem applicable to property rights, it is hard to see the right against 
self-incrimination, or of free speech, or to be free from unreasonable 
searches as tools of oppression. Such rights combat oppression. 
II. THE MYRIAD THEORIES OF RIGHTS 
A. Hohfeldian Theory 
Perhaps the most popular way of speaking about legal rights was 
formulated by Wesley Hohfeld.32 In the Western tradition, he de-
scribed legal relations in terms of various opposites and correlatives.33 
The opposites he discussed are right/no-right, privilege/duty, 
29 See Stone, supra note 3, at 488. 
30 See AJ.M. MILNE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIVERSITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (1986). 
31 Id. at 115. 
32 Courts have utilized Hohfeld's structures for analysis of legal terms in case law. See 
Califomia v. Fanners Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing property 
as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and imlllunities, citing Hohfeld); Lake Shore & 
M.S. Ry. Co. v. Kurtz, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (Ind. App. 1894). 
33 See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36 (1923). 
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power/disability, and immullity/liability.34 The correlatives are 
right/duty, privilege/no-right, power/liability, and immu-
nity/disability.35 In analyzing these terms, Hohfeld found that in legal 
discourse the term right is typically used broadly to include any legal 
advantage.36 He found this use of the term to be overbroad. Instead, 
he believed that the term "right" should be restricted in use to de-
scribe those things that correlate to duties.37 "Right" in his theory is 
synonymous with "claim. "38 Rights are simple and atomic; rights are 
claims based on duties.39 
Hohfeldian theory has been refined by later scholars including 
Carl Wellman.40 Wellman does not base rights on single Hohfeldian 
elements, like a duty or an immunity. Rather, he claims that a legal 
right is "a system of Hohfeldian positions that, if respected, confers 
dominion on one party in the face of some second party in a potential 
confrontation over a specific domain and are implied by the legal 
norm or norms that constitute that system. "41 One difference between 
Wellman's view and that of Hohfeld is that Wellman views rights not as 
simple concepts composed of individual elements, but as complexes 
potentially composed of many Hohfeldian liberties, powers, duties, 
and immunities.42 Nonetheless, these complexes of Hohfeldian ele-
ments have a core element or unifying constituent.43 Thus, there is 
some duty or other element that stands at the core of a right acting as 
the cement that holds the other elements of the right together. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. at 36-38, 71. 
37 See id. at 38, 71-72. Some case law has reflected this idea. For example, Sowers v. 
Civil Rights COllllll'n, 252 N.E.2d 463,474, holds that liberties are not properly considered 
rights, but rather are immunities. 
38 HOHFELD, supra note 33, at 38. 
39 SUMNER, supra note 2, at 33. 
40 See CARL WELLMAN, REAL RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WELLMAN, 1995]; CARL 
WEI~MAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAws, INSTITUTIONS, AND MORALS 
(1985) [hereinafter WELLMAN, 1985]. A similar project of refining the Hohfeldian descrip-
tion of rights is pursued by L.W. Sumner. See SUMNER, supra note 2, at 18-53. A Hohfeldian 
systelll has also been used to analyze environmental issues. See Peter Manus, One Hundred 
}CaI:S of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philosophies, 59 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 557, 570 passim (1998). 
41 WELLMAN, 1995, supra note 40, at 8. 
42 See id. at 80-82. See also California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (describing property as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, 
citing Hohfeld). 
43 See WELLMAN, 1995, supra note 40, at 81-82. 
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While Hohfeldian theory itself is primarily descriptive, Wellman's 
theory is normative. Wellman contends that there is an objective mo-
rality that grounds rights.44 There are true moral propositions and 
these moral propositions can be utilized to construct Hohfeldian 
elements from which rights may be fabricated.45 Legal rightholders 
then are those persons who have moral rights.46 
Hohfeld, of course, did not focus on animal rights issues. Well-
man's explication of Hohfeld's theory is not favorable to extending 
rights to animals. His theory requires that a rightholder be able to 
assert dominion; that is, a rightholder must be able to make claims 
against others.47 To assert this dominion, Wellman requires a 
rightholder to have a "will" or the ability to act as an agent, and ani-
mals presumably do not have this capacity.48 L.W. Sumner, using a 
Hohfeldian framework, has also concluded that animals cannot have 
rights since those who are rightholders must be able to comply with 
normative rules, which excludes animals.49 On the other hand, Gary 
Francione has found Hohfeldian theory to support granting rights to 
animals, but not in any sense that is actually favorable to the interests 
of animals.50 
One might raise a number of objections to Hohfeldian theory. 
Insofar as Hohfeld posits a "duty implies right" theory, it is not clear 
that all moral and legal duties imply rights. While a dispute over the 
rights of parties to a contractual dispute may fit conveniently into 
Hohfeld's structure, it is not evident that the theory can address more 
peculiar cases involving rights. 
For instance, one can have a moral duty to do the dishes, but it is 
difficult to assert that anyone or anything has a right that you do so.51 
One might say I have the duty to do the dishes to those with whom I 
live. But even so, it is difficult to view them as rightholders. Further, if 
I live alone, to whom could the duty be owed? Surely not to the 
4! See id. at 160-71. 
45 See id. 
46 See WELLMAN, 1995, s1lpra note 40, at 132. 
47 See id. at 105-36. 
48 Id. at 118-23. The concept of "will" is a philosophically loaded concept that is not 
clearly defined by Wellman. 
49 See SUMNER, S1lpra note 2, at 203. 
50 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAw 95-97 (1995). 
51 That duties may exist without corresponding rights is explained by Alan R. White. 
SeeALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 62-64 (1984). 
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dishes. To myself then? It is not clear that a duty to oneself can exist.52 
Closer to the law, we say that we have duties to the dead through 
mechanisms like wills, though there is no extant entity having a right 
corresponding to this duty. Thus, there are instances of duties without 
corresponding rights.53 
Similarly, we can see rights existing independently of duties.54 We 
may, for instance, have a right to think or behave in a certain way 
without there being any perceptible duty corresponding to the right.55 
Seeing $20 on the sidewalk, two people may have the right to pick it 
up, but there is no duty on the part of either party to allow the other 
to do SO.56 
Some philosophers assert that those who correlate rights with 
duties define "duty" much more broadly than is appropriate. Arthur 
Schopenhauer argues that "duties" are frequently referred to as any 
act that happens to be praiseworthy.57 According to Schopenhauer, 
"duty" should be limited to circumstances where the omission to act 
would be a wrong.58 Thus, duty exists only where there is an obliga-
tion to act, not where the obligation is to refrain from acting. Where 
one's obligation is to abstain from interfering, such an obligation is 
not a duty.59 Duties then depend on a party having an obligation to 
act; the paradigm case being where a person has entered into an ex-
press agreement to perform an act.60 
Further, since Hohfeld's theory is largely descriptive, it does not 
really tell us what grounds our duties and, thus, what ultimately 
grounds rights. While Hohfeld's theory may help us to identify and 
explicate legal issues, it is not a method for determining social and 
legal philosophical issues.61 More underlies rights than bare duties; 
duties themselves have grounds. Rights may have moral, policy, or 
emotive foundations, none of which are explained in Hohfeldian 
52 See WELLMAN, 1985, supra note 40, at 22. The problematic nature of duties to oneself 
is discussed in LEONARD NELSON, SYSTEM OF ETHICS 126-35 (Norben Guterman U'ans., 
1956). 
53 See WHITE, supra note 51, at 62-64. 
54 See id. at 64. See also H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? in THEORIES OF 
RIGHTS 81-82 (Je1'emyWaldmn ed., 1984). 
55 See VI'HITE, supra note 51, at 64. 
56 See Hart, supra note 54, at 80-81. 
57 See ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 215 (1996). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS xi (1964). 
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theory. Wellman's adaptation of Hohfeld attempts to address this 
question by providing an objective morality from which are con-
structed the complexes of Hohfeldian elements that ground rights. 
This theory, however, requires us to accept that there is an extant ob-
jective morality and to agree upon that objective morality.62 This is a 
project of considerable magnitude. 
Hohfeldian theory, even in Wellman's conception, is based on an 
assumption of conflict underlying rights. There must be two protago-
nists in confrontation before talk of rights arises.63 It is not clear that 
such conflict must exist for there to be proper talk of rights. A person 
has a right to free speech outside of confrontational situations where 
parties are pitted against one another. Conflicts involving rights raise 
questions of remedy-what mechanism do we use to resolve conflicts 
involving rights-not questions of the content or existence of rights. 
To view rights as inherently adversarial reflects a peculiar Western 
philosophical and political stance, one in which human relations are 
necessarily adversarial. Conflict is not, however, an essential element 
of the nature of rights. 
As will be developed later,64 there are aspects of rights that can-
not be captured in any complex of Hohfeldian elements. For this rea-
son, some commentators argue that the Hohfeldian elements, rights, 
powers, privileges, and immunities, are not sufficiently robust to cover 
all of the matters relevant to rights; other elements are of 
significance.65 There are, for example, emotive aspects to our concept 
of rights that are beyond the ken of this theory. Thus, despite the con-
tribution of Hohfeldian theory to our understanding of rights in cer-
tain contexts, there are areas in which the theory lacks the fullness 
that the concept of rights deserves. 
B. Interests as the Foundation oj Rights 
Perhaps the most often used theory to ground moral rights in 
animals is interest theory. The argument underlying this theory has 
been described as progressing in this fashion: 
62 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
63 See ~'ELLMAN, 1995, supra note 40, at 8. 
64 See infra Sections V-VI. 
65 See Albert Kocourek, Tabulae Min ores jurispruden tiae, 30 YALE LJ. 215, 222-25 (1921). 
Some have also argued that Hohfeld's theOl'y contains more elements than are necessary 
to describe rights. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurispm-
dence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIse. L. REv. 975, 992-93 (1982). 
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1. All and only beings with interests can have rights. 
2. Animals can have interests. 
3. Therefore, animals can have rights.66 
Although the first premise may be disputed, arguments relating to 
this theory frequently focus on the second premise-whether animals 
can have interests. 
Those who espouse this theory claim that animals have interests 
in that they have goods for themselves.67 These goods include being 
free from pain, having physiological needs met, and fulfilling their 
telos, their role or nature. Tom Regan, for example, claims that those 
entities that are the "subject of a life" have interests worthy of protec-
tion.68 Being the subject of a life entails having beliefs, desires, per-
ceptions, a sense of the future, an emotional life, and a psychological 
identity over time.69 Similarly, Joel Feinberg posits that to have inter-
ests there must be things that are good for the entity as a result of its 
nature and the entity must have a conative life.70 Freedom from pain 
is probably the most often cited interest mentioned as a foundation 
for animal interests,71 but as Regan and Feinberg describe, it is not 
the only one. 
Feinberg conceives of interests as compounds of desires and 
aims.72 In addition, Feinberg argues that to have desires and aims re-
quires that an entity have beliefs.73 To define "interests" in this sophis-
ticated way may considerably narrow the entities that can have inter-
ests and, in fact, may preclude animals from having them.74 
One obvious problem with interests as the basis for rights is that 
when we speak of "interests," we generally mean something that is as-
serted by an entity. To say that I have an interest in a piece of property 
or to be free from harassment includes the idea that I can assert this 
66 SeeR.G. FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE AGAINST ANIMALS 5 (1980); see also 
NELSON, supra note 52, at 136-44. 
67 See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 43-68 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974). 
68 TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 243 (1983). 
69 See id. 
70 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 43-68. 
71 See FREY, supra note 66, at 139-67. 
72 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 53. 
73 See id. These issues are also discussed in REGAN, supra note 68, at 34-35. 
74 See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text for discussion of issues relating to 
grounding interests in beliefs and desires. 
12 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:1 
interest within some institutional structure. Animals, of course, are 
not capable of asserting interests in this way. 75 
This problem can be solved by recognizing that interests can, and 
often are, asserted by representatives. We allow persons who are inca-
pable of asserting interests themselves, the deceased or incompetent, 
to be represented by executors, custodians, or guardians. There is lit-
tle reason to believe that animals cannot be represented in a legal sys-
tem in a similar way. In this regard, Feinberg distinguishes two types 
of legal representatives.76 The first is a representative who acts as the 
mouthpiece of the principal, doing precisely as directed by the prin-
cipaI,77 The second is a representative for a passive principal where 
the agent makes judgments on behalf of the principal. 78 This type of 
representative is used to represent incompetents and the interests of 
unknown future claimants in bankruptcy cases.79 Animals cannot have 
representatives of the first kind for obvious reasons, but surely can 
have representatives of the second kind. 
Interest theory, perhaps since it has been oft used as a basis for 
animal rights, has been regularly criticized. It'has, for example, been 
argued that to have interests one must have a will; one must be able to 
assert one's interests.8o For this reason, it is said that animals cannot 
be rightholders. As we have observed, however, this is patently false 
even in our present legal structures. We say that incompetents have 
rights, though they cannot themselves assert them. We even say that 
unidentified future claimants, entities who are unknown or may not 
yet exist, have rights to representation.81 Thus, this objection lacks 
merit within existing legal structures. 
To say that interests are the basis for rights, however, may paint 
with too broad a brush. For example, it may be "in the interest" of a 
tree not to be cut down, but most people would not say that a tree has 
the right not to be cut down. Similarly, I may have an interest in hav-
ing wine with dinner, but we would not say I have a right to wine with 
dinner. In the case of the tree we can solve the problem by requiring 
75 One might, however, see animals as asserting interests when they protect themselves 
from others or assert dominion over territory. Thus, in some ways animals can be seen as 
asserting interests. They just aloe not able to do so in the context of institutions requiring 
use oflanguage. 
76 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 47-48. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See In reJohns Manville, 36 B.R. 743, 757-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.¥. 1984). 
80 See WELLMAN, 1995, supra note 40, at 116, 119. 
81 See In re Johns Manville, 36 B.R. at 757-58. 
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that an entity have consciousness or, in Regan's terminology, be the 
subject of a life to have rights. On the other hand, this may be seen as 
an arbitrary and ur~ustified dividing line. This line, however, does 
have some sense in that only conscious entities can perceive their in-
terests and this must count for something in defining and measuring 
the strength of interests. One might also solve the problem by assert-
ing that trees do have interests.82 
My interest in wine with dinner presents a different problem. We 
use "interest" language to describe preferences that are in no sense 
essential or of great import. With respect to such things we do not use 
the language of rights. Thus, to define rights in terms of interests, the 
definition must refer to some subset of interests, not everything re-
ferred to in everyday parlance as interests. We are left then with the 
task of setting parameters on which interests ground rights and which 
do not. Interests that ground rights must be of some special purport 
essential to carrying out our telos. 
Another criticism of interest theory has been explicated by RG. 
Frey. According to Frey, to have an "interest" requires two things: that 
something be in the interest of the entity and that the entity ought to 
have concern about the thing.83 The fonner requirement is illustrated 
by saying that "good health is in the interest of X. "84 Thus, animals 
can have interests in this way insofar as there are goods that are in 
their interest.85 But, according to Frey, farm tractors can also have in-
terests in this sense.86 
Frey's second aspect of an interest is illustrated by saying "X has 
an interest in good health."87 To have an interest in this prescriptive 
sense requires that an entity have beliefs and desires about the thing 
in question being good.88 Interests in this sense, Frey argues, cannot 
be said to exist in animals.89 This is based on the claim that animals 
cannot have beliefs and desires. This latter assertion is founded on 
the argument that in order to have beliefs and desires one must have 
language, and animals do not have linguistic capacity.90 Similarly, Frey 
argues that animals do not have emotions which also might be a 
82 See Stone, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
83 See FREY, supra note 66, at 19. 
84 See id. at 78. 
85 See id. at 79. 
86 See id. at 80-8l. 
87 See id. at 78. 
88 See FREY, supra note 66, at 82-83. 
89 See id. at 83. 
90 See id. at 85. 
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ground of interests.91 According to Frey, emotions also require beliefs 
and desires.92 
One objection to Frey's argument is that there are simple desires 
that do not require complex processes like beliefs or emotions, and 
therefore do not require language. Frey rejects this, stating that no 
such simple desires exist in those without linguistic capacity.93 Frey 
asserts this position without clear support. 
Frey's challenge to the idea that interests can exist in animals is a 
serious one. Nonetheless, it is founded on a number of controversial 
and possibly incorrect premises. It has been argued by Regan that the 
prescriptive element is really not necessary for there to be interests 
extant in animals that are not extant in tractors.94 Further, it is not 
clear that at least some animals do not have desires and beliefs, or 
that desires and beliefs require language.95 Animals exhibit desires 
and beliefs by their behavior. We frequently see them pursuing things 
that appear to be goals. Also, some animals may use language.96 
At bottom, the interest theory of rights is the one most frequently 
asserted in support of animal rights. Interest theory, however, is not 
without difficulties that limit its usefulness as the sole ground for as-
serting rights in animals. 
C. Dignity as the Foundation of Rights 
Rights may be grounded in the characteristic or set of character-
istics that constitute "dignity." Here it is argued, based on the phi-
losophy of Immanuel Kant, that humans and perhaps other creatures 
have a characteristic or set of characteristics that we call dignity, that 
dignity is of value (presumably moral value) and that rights are neces-
sary to protect the value of this dignity.97 The sense of dignity involved 
here is not an "empirical" sense, that is, to act in a "dignified" way, but 
is dignity in the sense of being a creature having intrinsic value.98 
91 See id. at 122. 
92 See id. at 123, 127. 
93 See FREY, supra note 66, at 107. 
94 See id. at 19. 
95 See JACQUES VAUCLAIR, ANIMAL COGNITION 137-45 (1996); James Rachels, Do Ani-
mals Have a Right to Liberty?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 214-18 (Tom 
Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976). 
96 See VAUCLAIR, supra note 95, at 101-05. 
97 See Alan Geworth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS 10, 11, 24 (Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Pal'ent eds., 1992); see also Wise, supra note 4, 
at 869-70. 
98 See Geworth, supra note 97, at 12. 
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Alan Geworth has found this inherent value to arise out of the 
value of purposive actions taken by entities.99 He argues that pur-
posive actions by agents have worth to those agents and from this 
worth agents regard themselves and others as having dignity.IOO Since 
all agents see other agents pursuing purposive actions as having dig-
nity, we must commit to grant rights to all such .agents so that they 
may pursue those actions that give them dignity.lOI 
Steven Wise has stated that dignity may be a basis for granting 
rights to animals.102 While it is ordinarily thought that dignity requires 
full Kantian autonomy, that is, the ability to be completely rational in 
making choices, Wise states that a lower threshold, what he calls "real-
istic autonomy," is actually used by courts to determine the existence 
of dignity-related rights.I°3 This realistic autonomy is something less 
than the perfect ability to make choices.104 Wise supports realistic 
autonomy as the foundation of dignity rights by noting that there is 
case law granting rights to humans who clearly do not have cognitive 
abilities necessary to make fully rational decisions. Io5 Wise argues in 
Rattling the Cage that at least chimpanzees and bonobos can meet this 
formulation of autonomy.I06 
Whether this project will ultimately be successful in imbuing 
animals with meaningful rights will depend on how broadly the con-
cept of realistic autonomy is interpreted. It may be that it will only 
bring within the concept of dignity a small number of animals. If the 
hope is to make rights widely applicable to animals, then dignity as a 
basis for animal rights may not be successful. 
D. Contractual and Other Theories of Rights 
Some theorists, including John Rawls, ground rights and other 
aspects of the legal system on a hypothetical contract basis.I07 In such 
a theory, we imagine ourselves in some original position, like the state 
of nature, and determine what sort of contractual arrangement we 
99 See id. at 2l. 
100 See id. at 23. 
101 See id. at 24. 
102 See Wise, supra note 4, at 900. 
103 See id. at 874. 
104 See id. at 873-74. 
105 See id. at 877-78. See also Care and Protection of Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 
1992). 
106 See STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (forthcoming 1999). 
107 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111 (1971); see also Rachels, supra note 95, at 
221-22. 
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would arrive at if we were to create a society in which we are required 
to live with others. In this hypothetical original position, however, we 
are told in advance that we are rational entities, that is, humans; it is 
not possible that we ultimately be instantiated as some other species. 
The contractual view requires reciprocity-there can only be obliga-
tions between those capable of respecting the interests of others,lo8 
This makes sense if one is grounding one's theory in contract. A reci-
procity requirement is obviously not favorable to animals since they 
are not rational beings able to engage in this kind of interplay. The 
theory is then conceptually loaded against animals. 
One problem with assuming a requirement of rationality in our 
hypothetical contracting parties is that it leaves out of consideration 
some humans that nearly everyone believes have rights-infants, chil-
dren, and the mentally handicapped-but do not have full rationality. 
Also, if we proceed from the hypothetical standpoint of some original 
position, it is hard to conceive why we must assume that we will not 
ultimately be instantiated as a species other than human. Indeed, 
Rawls' theory can be construed to protect the interests of animals,l09 
Presumably, we would do this by assuming in our original position 
that we might come into the world as non-human animals. 
It is also argued against this contractual theory that it assumes 
there are some grounding rules prior to the hypothetical contract. no 
In other words, there must be some foundational rule that requires 
that we go along with the result of the contract that arises out of the 
original position.lll What is this rule and how is it grounded? Without 
this rule and its foundation, the theory is incomplete and rests on un-
explained premises. 
At its nadir, this theory does not address how we actually ground 
rights in our legal system, but rather how we might explain the gene-
sis of a legal system that has rules like ours. It is, thus, an interesting 
conceptual exercise, but not one that explains the way we actually 
ground rights or the considerations and policies that actually go into 
rights. ll2 
108 See Rachels, supra note 95, at 222. 
109 See ROSEMARY RODD, BIOLOGY, ETHICS AND ANIMALS 241-50 (1990). 
no See EVELYN B. PLUHAR, BEYOND PREJUDICE 235 (1995). 
III See id. 
112 Many other theories have been advanced to explain legal rights but typically have 
not been applied to animal rights issues. For example, legal realists regard rights as reme-
dies such that having a l"ight requires having the power to obtain a remedy. See DONNELLY, 
supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 816. Ronald Dworkin described several views of 
rights, including rights as trumps that oven-ide policies contrary to the right, and rights as 
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Except in the case of interest theories and Wise's dignity theory, 
one common strand runs through the theories reviewed: a focus on 
human, as opposed to animal or ecological concerns. There has nev-
ertheless been some movement by scholars to spotlight other prob-
lems. Laurence Tribe, for instance, outlines a view of ecological issues 
that is not anthropocentric. He proposes a new paradigm for thinking 
about ecological issues that looks beyond human needs and con-
cerns.l13 The present anthropocentric paradigm, according to Tribe, 
defines the world as raw material to be manipulated for human de-
mands.u4 This manipulation is performed within a structure of West-
ern dichotomies, God/man, human/animal, etc.,1l5 that manufac-
tures boundaries between these concepts that cannot be bridged. 
Tribe calls this the "theory of transcendence" under which human 
needs transcend all other concerns, including ecology or animals. 
A theory that moves diametrically away from such 
anthropocentricity is one of "imminence" that sees value and sacred-
ness in all of nature and its constituents.1l6 To Tribe, however, such a 
view proves too much; it may not be possible or appropriate for soci-
ety to go this far in changing its fundamental principles.l17 
Instead, Tribe suggests a synthesis of the transcendence and im-
manence theories.uB Such a view avoids the ecological pitfalls of 
anthropocentrism.1l9 Tribe's view comprehends reverence for na-
ture-nature is something more than just fodder for the satisfaction 
of human desires.l20 Accordingly, there are obligations to animal and 
plant life.l21 Tribe notes in this regard that rights have been given, in 
reasons used to justifY results of legal disputes. See DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 18, 20. 
H.L.A. Hart has also reasoned that to have a right is to have a reason to restrict the free-
dom of others. See Hart, supra note 54, at 83-84, 89. Rights have also been described as 
entitlements, resources, rhetoric, and as a reflection of the goals of society. See MILNE, su-
pra note 30, at 102; DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 25, 45. Rights have even been based on 
consequentialist moral theol"y and recognized as a means of enabling communication 
between gwups. See SUMNER, supra note 2, at 163, 188. 
m See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways NDt to' Think AbDut Plastic Trees: New FDundatiDns for Envi-
TDnmentalLaw, 83 YALE LJ. 1315, 1326-27 (1974). 
114 See id. at 1330. 
115 See id. at 1333. 
116 See id. at 1336-37. 
117 See id. at 1338. 
118 See Tribe, supra note 113, at 1338. 
119 See id. at 1340. 
120 See id. at 1341. 
121 See id. at 1341-42. 
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certain circumstances, to entities other than humans, like churches, 
corporations, and animals in animal welfare laws,122 
It should be clear by now that there are many divergent and 
complex views regarding what rights are and what our reasons are for 
respecting them. The views range from those of critical legal studies 
scholars and some feminists who believe rights have little or no utility, 
to those who believe that rights can be used to solve myriad problems, 
including protection of animals. One typical and critically important 
characteristic of the many foundational concepts of rights is their at-
tempt to ground rights in some single concept or a very restricted set 
of concepts. But before discussing this issue, a closer look at rights 
concepts and animals is required. 
III. RIGHTS THEORY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Whatever underlying theory of rights one chooses to accept, 
when the issue is whether animals have rights, discussion inevitably 
focuses on the issue of what characteristics an entity must have to be a 
rightholder. It is generally thought that possessors of rights all must 
share some one common attribute,123 
In a prior article, I discussed the justifications for different treat-
ment of humans and animals that ground views that animals cannot 
have rights.124 I will not restate in detail these justifications, but will 
outline the arguments concerning the characteristics necessary to be 
a rightholder. 
Some scholars ground rights in rationality. Contractarian theo-
rists require rational agency in order to participate in contracting in 
the original position.125 A diluted rationality theory, however, might 
be used to argue for placing animals in the domain of rightholders. 
122 Id. I do not think the analogy between animals and corporations is a good one. To 
say that rights other than human rights are recognized when rights are given to corpora-
tions and churches is to ignore that the constituents of such organizations are humans. 
Thus, to the extent that these entities have rights, they are just a form of human rights. 
Many people, including myself, dispute that animals have been given rights in the law. 
There are certain laws that protect animals from certain kinds of treatment, but these do 
not constitute grants of rights. These laws are little more than laws that prevent vandalism 
to private property and do' 1I0t provide for l"edress 011 behalf of the animals. They may be 
seen as laws ultimately intended to protect certain human interests. Nonetheless, for an 
exposition of the view that some present laws create rights in animals, see Wise supra note 
4, at 910-13. 
123 See supra notes 32-122 and accompanying text. 
124 See Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.V. ENVTL. LJ. 
531,559-60 (1998). 
125 See RAWLS, supra note 107, at 111-12. 
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For instance, if one said that sentience or consciousness, rather than 
rationality, was the key to rights, then at least some animals might be 
included among rightholders. For example, Tom Regan proposes that 
rightholders are entities that are "subjects-of-a-life."126 This criterion 
requires that the animal be something more than just conscious; the 
animal must have, among other characteristics, beliefs, desires and 
perceptions, a sense of the future, an emotional life, and a psycho-
logical identity over time.127 This criterion may spread rights very 
thinly, however, since it is not clear how many animals have all of the 
elements necessary to be subjects of a life. 
Moral autonomy also has been asserted to be the characteristic 
necessary to have rights. To have rights under this theory, an entity 
must be one that can comply with normative constraints.128 Such a 
theory excludes from the group of rightholders animals, incompe-
tents, and children.129 
It is also argued that in order to have rights one must be able to 
make claims-to assert one's rights.130 Without modification, this re-
quires that a rightholder have linguistic and other abilities that are 
characteristic of those who have considerable cognitive abilities. The 
idea can, however, be modified to allow for assertion of rights by ani-
mals through the use of representatives.I 31 
Alan White proposes that those who possess rights are those who 
can be sensibly spoken about in "the full language of rights. "132 To be 
spoken about in the full language of rights requires that an entity be 
able to assert and exercise rights.J33 This, he contends, rules animals 
out as possessors of rights, since it requires rationality and linguistic 
ability.134 
If we ground rights in interests, we broaden the group of entities 
to whom rights may be granted. If we view being free from pain as an 
interest that animals possess that is worthy of respect, then rights for 
animals can be constructed from this interest. Interests might, in ad-
dition, include things like physical liberty and freedom in such a way 
as to construct even more complex rights for animals. 
126 See REGAN, supra note 68, at 243. 
127 See id. 
128 See SUMNER, supra Hote 2, at 203. 
129 See id. 
130 See Feinbel'g, supra note 67, at 43-44. 
131 Seeid. at 47. 
132 See \\'HITE, supra note 51, at 89. 
133 See id. at 90. 
134 See id. 
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It is not my intent to settle the issue of what characteristic or 
characteristics are necessary to be a rightholder. Rather, I merely 
point out that there is considerable impetus toward identifYing some 
single property as the foundation for being a rightholder. 
IV. MORALITY AND LEGAL RIGHTS 
In discussing questions of legal rights, it is useful, if not crucial, 
to determine whether there is or should be a connection between le-
gal rights and morality. Are legal rights just conventional legal reme-
dies as a realist might contend or are they connected, at least ideally, 
to some system of moral principles? 
Legal positivists, who have wielded considerable influence in this 
century, deny a connection between law and morality.135 For legal 
positivists, there is no law apart from government and its institutions 
and, as a result, no rights apart from those ceded by the state.136 
Philosophically, this idea can be traced to Kant, who saw morality ex-
isting in the realm of reason, quite separate from the sensible world 
where the law and, thus, rights operate,l37 Similarly, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes stated that morality requires us to look at the internal state of 
mind of an actor, while the law concerns itself only with external 
signs.138 
Nonetheless, there are those who continue to claim a connection 
between law and morality, and thus, between legal rights and morality. 
It has been stated that morality logically preceeds the law.139 In this 
vein, it is argued that while we can have morality without law, we can-
not have law without morality.l40 Morality is necessary for the law, 
since without it there can be no basis for a general obligation to fol-
low the law. l41 In other words, for law to be efficacious, there must be 
a transcending moral rule that directs compliance with the law. 
135 See DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843; RICHARD POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 10-11 (1990). 
136 See DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843. 
137 See George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 
533, 535 (1987). 
138 See Michele Moody-Adams, On the Old Saw that Character is Destiny, in IDENTITY, 
CHARACTER AND MORALITY Ill, 113 (Owen Flanagan & Alllelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 
1990). 
139 See MILNE, supra note 30, at 28. 
140 See id. at 141-42. 
141 See id. 
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Natural rights theorists, of course, base the law on moral the-
ory.142 Carl Wellman, for example, ultimately grounds rights in fun-
damental moral principles in his expansion of Hohfeldian theory.l43 
In his theory, those who have legal rights are exactly those who have 
moral rights.l44 
There are, of course, a number of ways to connect law and moral-
ity. One might subscribe to the idea that there are ontologically extant 
moral principles finding their source in God or elsewhere that are the 
basis for the law. On the other hand, one might take a less metaphysi-
cally challenging position and claim that there are natural rights that 
issue from moral theory, but this moral theory does not require onto-
logical entities to represent this morality.145 Or one might say that 
moral rights are based on true moral propositions that bear on hu-
man conduct in a way that has practical consequences and rele-
vance.l46 To say that there are moral rights, then, is to say that there 
are true moral reasons, the truth of which can be proven.147 These 
moral rights can then be translated into legal rights.148 The funda-
mental rights we view as extant in the context of international law are 
an example.149 
Yet looser connections between law and morality might exist. 
H.L.A. Hart claims, for example, that while there may be no simple 
identification of moral with legal rights, there is some "intimate" con-
nection,150 For Hart, morality creates limits on oue's freedom to inter-
fere with others, thereby determining the content of legal rules and 
rights. 151 
Ronald Dworkin also believes that morality plays a role in legal 
rights. He distinguishes between "goals" that he sees as supported by 
policy arguments and "rights" that are supported by moral princi-
ples,152 Thus, there is a qualitative distinction between matters sup-
ported by policy and matters supported by moral principle. The latter 
acquire the status of rights. Those who claim that rights are based on 
142 See, e.g., WELLMAN 1985, supra note 40, at 107-70. 
143 See id. WELLMAN 1995, supra note 40, at 132-35. 
144 WELLMAN 1995, supra note 40, at 132. 
145 See id. at 169-70. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 132. 
148 See id. 
149 See, e.g., Wise, supra note 4, at 846--57. 
150 See HART, supra note 54, at 77, 79. 
151 See id. 
152 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90 (1978). 
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"interests" also ground the existence of these interests on moral ar-
guments, thereby grounding rights in moral principles.l53 Even critics 
of rights, like Mary Midgley, recognize that if there are rights, they are 
in some way linked to morality.I54 
For the purposes of this article it will be assumed that there is or 
should be a connection between morality and law. There is good rea-
son to take such a position. The divorce of law from morality can be 
seen as the foundation for systems, like Nazism, that base what is right 
on the wielding of power. I55 Such legal systems may be avoided by 
firmly grounding the law in accepted moral principles. It is not the 
purpose of this article to specifY these moral principles or to propose 
a moral theory. Nor is it my goal to claim that there is some set of on-
tologically extant moral principles that can by one means or another 
be discovered.I56 Rather, all that need be said is that law and rights 
have, or should have, a connection to moral principles, whatever 
these may be-the collective moral precepts of society, true moral 
propositions, or natural law. 
V. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF RIGHTS THEORIES 
Western thought tends to attempt to reduce disparate concepts 
to a unified theory. We look for one explanation that resolves all of 
our questions about a subject. For example, the Holy Grail of physics 
is the search for a unified theory, resolving conflicts in quantum the-
ory and general relativity theory. While such a structure may fit hard 
sciences, in human affairs one must question its efficacy. 
Similarly, we look at the issue of rights as one that requires a sin-
gle explanation. Hohfeld sees rights as correlative with duties. Well-
man refines this by founding rights on a set of Hohfeldian elements, 
revolving around a single central core. Regan and others see rights as 
founded in interests. Other theories see rights variously as remedies, 
reasons, goals, or rhetoric. The common theme is that there is an ex-
planation. 
Is there an explanation of the foundations or sources of rights? 
Might rights have diverse sources? The notion that a single concep-
tual foundation adequately describes legal rights appears dubitable.I57 
153 See REGAN, supra note 68, at 87-88. 
154 See MIDGLEY, supra note 20, at 62-63. 
155 See Wise, supra note 4, at 843. 
156 See WELLMAN 1985, supra note 40, at 122-31 (stating that such ontological moral 
principals are not necessary to argue for connection between law and morality). 
157 See SUMNER, supra note 2, at 19-20. 
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It seems wrong as a matter of fact because it has been widely recog-
nized ill the law, at least since Hohfeld, that rights can be described in 
many ways.l58 As a matter of theory it appears wrong because "impor-
tantly different notions of a right, each of them proper, might 
profitably coexist in the law. "159 
When we ask about the foundation or source of a right we actu-
ally have many valid answers. For example, if one asked about the 
foundation of the right to own property, one might say that under the 
generally accepted moral principles of our society, private property is 
a fundamental good that we protect through the creation of a 
"right. "160 Wellman or others might subscribe to some natural inher-
ent liberty right to own property exclusive of others; a person who 
appropriates property through her effort is protected by a right.l61 Or 
we might say that a person has rights in property because we grant a 
remedy to the person with title to property when there is some inter-
ference with the property. This allows the smooth functioning of soci-
ety and its institutions. The goal of maximizing wealth in society may 
be a ground for promoting rights in private property. In one way or 
another each of these concepts grounds our idea of rights in property, 
and all of these ideas are in some sense correct.162 
In an interest theory we can identify the interests of persons who 
should be free from unnecessary pain and suffering as a foundation 
for the right to be free from such cruel and unusual punishment. So-
cietal goals supporting a ban on cruel and unusual punishment may 
include making society compassionate and feeling. In the rhetoric of 
liberal societies, we see this right as fundamental to the dignity of 
humans. Again, as in the case of property rights, we can ground the 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in several ways, 
all of which appear well founded. 
Looking at rights as grounded in a single concept or founda-
tional idea is an oversimplification. Rights are complex concepts 
158 See id. at 19. 
159 Id. at 19-20. 
160 See Robert H. Welson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal 
Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 645, 645-46 (1997). 
161 John Locke saw labOl' as the foundation of ownership of property. See id. at 646. 
162 Consider another example. We say that there is a right in criminals not to suffer 
cruel and unusual punishment. It is evident that our moral sense is offended by the rack 
and whip. Thus, a concept of rights grounded in any tenable lIlOl'al theory supports a pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 
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founded on moral, policy, societal, and cultural ideas.163 Thus, we 
should not focus on finding some single basis for a right, but on dis-
covering the sundry elements of a right. The more bases we find for a 
right the more firmly convinced we may be that it is a legitimate and 
well-founded right. Indeed, it might be appropriate to call rights 
"composites"-they are compounds of numerous interconnected 
ideas that mingle together in a loosely cohesive whole. Unlike Well-
man's view of rights as complexes of Hohfeldian components, this 
"composite" view is not limited in the kinds of things that can serve as 
foundations for rights and is not committed to some core element as 
the ultimate foundation of each right. The core of a right may be mo-
lecular rather than atomic; it may be a composite of various ingredi-
ents. 
Perhaps W.V.O. Quine's view of knowledge is an apt analogy.164 
Quine viewed knowledge as comprised of interconnecting links (think 
of a spider web) joined at the core by certain fundamental princi-
ples.165 These central principles are strongly held beliefs that are not 
easily swayed. As we move away from these central principles, new in-
formation may modifY the structure of the web. The foundational 
principles at the center of the web, however, will generally be left un-
affected by new information. With respect to rights, certain central 
ideas may ground rights, while various subsidiary ideas surround 
these central concepts. The general stability of rights concepts over 
time is attributable to the strength of the central principles founding 
rights. The capacity for change over time comes from the gradual re-
shaping of the perimeter of the web and ultimately, through this re-
shaping process, modification of the central principles through evolv-
ing morals, goals, and other principles. 
Consider the earlier example of property rights. In Schematic 1, 
a number of central founding principles compose a property right, all 
of critical importance, surrounded by lesser subsidiary ideas. 
15. 
163 This idea is in line with Donnelly's horizons theory. See DONNELLY. supra note 11, at 
164 SeeW.V.O. Quine, Truth by Convention, in THE WAYS OF PARADOX 77,101-03 (1976). 
165 See id. 
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This schematic obviously oversimplifies the relations of these con-
cepts. More connections could be made between the various princi-
ples and many other subsidiary principles could be mentioned.l66 
Nonetheless, this schematic can be seen as "a family tree" for the con-
ceptual foundation of a right to property. It is in this fashion that I 
believe rights are actually grounded. 
VI. AN EMOTIVE ASPECT OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 
A. The Unity of Emotion and Reason 
1. Emotion and Moral Theory 
Generally, emotions are thought to be unimportant to moral 
theory.I67 It is a maxim of Western thought that one is to avoid con-
tamination of moral theory with compassion, sympathy, or caring.l68 
This extension of a religion of science into moral theoryI69 may ulti-
166 To repl'esent this schematically, however, would require more than the two dimen-
sions provided by a sheet of pape!". 
167 See MICHAEL STOCKER, VALUING EMOTIONS 1 (1996). 
168 A number of emotions may be relevant to moral thought. The ones that appear of 
relevance to animal issues are sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is a harmony of feelings 
between entities, while empathy is identification v.ith or vicarious experiencing of the feel-
ings of another. The most relevant emotion here may be empathy. Nonetheless, to capture 
both feelings of sympathy and empathy, I will generally refer to "compassion" as the emo-
tion most relevant to moral issues as they relate to animals. 
169 See STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS 154 (1977). 
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mately be credited to Kant.170 In Kant's moral theory, duty is the 
foundation of morality, and through the application of reason we dis-
cover our duties.I7I Reason is distinguished from emotion. This dis-
tinction assumes that emotion is irrational. 
In Western thought, what is rational is good and what is not ra-
tional is bad.172 Emotions, overwhelming feelings that cloud rational-
ity and ultimately have deleterious effects, facilitate irrationality. 
There are certain "commonplaces" or prejudices that we have about 
emotion and rationality that lead to these viewsP3 Cool rationality is 
believed to be the best state for inquiry and acquisition of knowledge, 
and emotions must always be in tight control lest we stray from the 
proper path to understanding.174 
This gulf between morality (and, thus, law) on one side and emo-
tion on the other is followed by most modern theorists on animal 
rights issues. Peter Singer, for example, makes a point of stating that 
his foundation for a new way of looking at the treatment of animals is 
devoid of emotive elements.175 Tom Regan also does not allow for 
consideration of emotion in his interest theoryP6 
There are, nonetheless, those who espouse a role for the emotive 
in moral theory. For example, some feminist thinkers hold open a 
role for compassion in moral thought, though not for the purpose of 
finding a foundation for rights. 177 From this perspective emotion and 
compassion are a normal part of the human condition and can be 
170 See Josephine Donovan, Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment 
of Animals, in BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS 147, 148-49 (Josephine Donovan & Carol]. Adam 
eds.,1996). 
171 See MARCIA W. BARON, MNTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY 112 (1995). 
Baron argues that perhaps Kant has been misinterpreted. She sees the typical view of 
Kant's moral theory as not ascribing importance to love, fellow feeling, and the like to be a 
defect in Kantian moral theory, but reads Kant as actually allowing a role for the emotive 
in morals. She argues that Kant encourages the development of sympathetic and othe1' 
feelings as a part of morality. See id. at 212-18. To Baron, Kant finds value in emotions in 
motivating us to do those things that are "imperfect duties," those things that we cannot be 
expected to do from duty alone. Id. at 220. These emotions must, however, be controlled 
by reason. See id. at 203. 
172 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 91-92. 
173Id. at 92. 
174 See id. 
175 SINGER, supra note 8, at ii-iii. 
176 REGAN, supra note 68, at 123-24. 
177 See generally Ka1'en ]. WaITen, The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism, 12 
ENVTL. ETHICS 125 (1990). 
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utilized to ground and analyze moral positions.I78 One might say that 
morality, at bottom, requires that one care about or have certain feel-
ings about an issueP9 Without such feelings there is no morality.180 
Though perhaps ordinarily foreign to our thought, the idea that 
emotion plays a role in morality can be extracted from major thinkers 
in our Western tradition. While most philosophers hold the view that 
reason must conquer passions, David Hume reversed this idea and 
claimed that reason should be the slave of passion.181 Hume was of the 
view that the passions are the basis for all moral thought. His view was 
based on the idea that reason is inert; it is just the mechanism used 
for the discovery of truth or falsehood-it concerns the relation of 
ideas or the existence of facts.182 Passions, volitions, and actions are 
not susceptible to being true or false and, thus, cannot be the subject 
of reason.183 Morality is concerned with actions, and since actions 
have their basis in passions, passions are the foundation of morals.184 
To those who attempt to ground morals in reason, Hume states: 
There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by 
certain philosophers, that morality is susceptible of demon-
stration [through reason]; and tho' no one has ever been 
able to advance a single step in those demonstrations; yet 'tis 
taken for granted, that this science may be brought to an 
equal certainty with geometry or algebra.185 
Morals are not matters of fact and therefore are not the subject 
of reason. Nor are morals demonstrable with use of reason: 
But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and vir-
tue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by 
reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, 
for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find 
that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In 
which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, 
178 See Brian Luke,justice, Caring, and Animal Liberation, in BEYOND .ANIMAL RIGHTS 77, 
82-86 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996). 
179 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259-60. 
180 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259-60. 
181 See Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 127, 127 
(Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
182 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 510 (1969). 
183 See id. at 509-10. 
184 See id. 
185 [d. at 515. 
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motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of 
fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you 
consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your 
reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of dis-
approbation, which arises in you, towards this action. I86 
Hume states that there is an innate moral sense that grounds our 
moral awareness.l87 The vice and virtue that we see in the world are 
determined by certain impressions or sentiments (feelings) that are 
innate in humans.I88 Moral evaluations are perception-kinds of 
pains and pleasures.l89 Morality is felt, notjudged.l90 
These moral impressions are natural in the sense that all humans 
have them and all societies reflect them. I9I Moral feelings are rooted 
in our constitution and temper, and cannot be jettisoned except 
through disease or madness.l92 Marcia Lind argues that Hume viewed 
emotions as complexes of both feeling and cognitive elements that 
are inextricably connected and hard wired into our constitutions.l93 
Hume can therefore avoid the charge of being a radical subjectivist 
concerning morality.l94 Since there is a natural method of connecting 
feelings with the objects of feelings, this method can be discovered 
without subjectivism.I95 
Schopenhauer held a similar view of the root of morality. He saw 
compassion as the foundation for morality and an undeniable fact of 
human consciousness. Compassion is original and immediate, and 
resides in human nature itself.l96 Even Western science admits of 
these ideas. Research concerning kin altruism suggests that there is 
an innate sense of sympathy in other animals, and through Darwinian 
theory we must recognize this as a part of our makeup.l97 
Plato too, though in a more subtle way, held that emotion has a 
role in morality. He thought that although reason is in control of the 
186 [d. at 520. 
187 See id. at 520-21; see al50 Donovan, supra note 170, at 154. 
188 See HUME, supra note 182, at 520-21. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. at 526. 
192 See id. See also Marcia Lind, Hume and Moral Emotions, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND 
MORALITY 133, 142-43 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 
193 See Lind, supra note 192, at 142-43. 
194 See id. at 144. 
195 See id. at 144-45. 
196 See SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 57, at 208. 
197 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 155. 
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passions, they are allies in the search for moral truth.198 Aristotle 
thought that to be a good person one must have the right emotional 
makeup.l99 Thus, there is considerable support, even in Western 
thought, for the view that emotion plays a role in moral theory. 
As noted earlier, the exile of the emotive from moral theory is 
based on the idea that emotion is dangerous and must always be gov-
erned by reason. It is asserted, by focussing on certain extreme cases 
of emotional outbursts, that emotions are undesirable elements in 
inquiry and elsewhere.2OO We view emotion as causing utter subjectiv-
ity due to the lack of any element of reason.201 It is thought that emo-
tion is the antithesis of rationality.202 To allow emotive aspects into 
moral theory is to descend into an abyss of irrationality and mysticism. 
This dichotomy of emotion and reason is false. Reason is some-
times mistaken.203 Reason can go astray through undue credulity or 
skepticism, or inappropriate acceptance of authority.204 There are in-
deed times when it is appropriate to say "don't get rational about 
this," just as we sometimes admonish people not to get emotiona1.205 
Indeed, Justice William Brennan decried the cold harshness of our 
focus on reason as being a threat to the human dignity that is the ba-
sis of our constitution: 
The framers [of the United States Constitution] operated 
within a political and moral universe that had experienced 
arbitrary passion as the greatest affront to tlle dignity of the 
citizen. . . . In our own time, attention to experience may 
signal that the greatest threat to due process principles is 
formal reason severed from the insight ofpassion.206 
There are, in all acts of reason, emotive elements in the back-
ground.207 The entry of emotion into consciousness does not empty 
198 See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 127. 
199 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 1. 
200 See id. at 94-95. 
201 See Lind, supra note 192, at 133. 
202 See Wise, supra note 4, at 824. Wise describes the "subjective" as non-logical and in-
capable of proof. 
203 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 93. 
204 See id. at 94. 
205 See id. at 99-100. 
206 William Brennan, Reason, Passion and 'The Progress of the Law', 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 
3,17 (1988). 
207 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 100. 
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the mind of reason.208 Cognition and reason remain notwithstanding 
the surfacing of emotion into consciousness.209 If emotions are com-
plexes of both feeling and cognitive elements, then the common-
places about emotions cannot be maintained.210 For example, to have 
compassion, the main emotional element of relevance to animal is-
sues, involves both intellectual and emotional understanding.211 It is, 
thus, unlikely that we can ever separate emotion from reason. Our 
concern, then, in applying emotive elements to moral and legal issues 
should not be to avoid all emotion but to avoid emotion devoid of 
reason. 
Emotion threatens reason only when it is uncontrolled,212 not in 
the more typical cases of controlled emotion. Ordinarily emotions are 
unmomentous, long lasting, diffuse, and pervasive.213 Examples are 
the affection we may have for a friend or the dull fear of going to the 
dentist. Emotions are not just the extreme occurrences that we often 
call "emotional" responses.214 Instead, much of our emotional life is 
found "in the backgrounds, the tones and tastes of life. "215 The mun-
daneness of ordinary emotional life has been described in the follow-
ingway: 
[T] here is no action without affect, to be sure not always an 
intense, dramatic affect as in an action of impulsive rage, but 
more usually a total, sometimes quite marked, sometimes 
very subtle and hardly noticeable mood, which nevertheless 
constitutes an essential background of every action.216 Thus, 
emotion is ordinarily a normal, unmomentous and not nec-
essarily disruptive part of our experience.217 
The employment of the emotive in moral and legal discussions 
will surely be met with criticism. One problem with adding an emotive 
208 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259-60; 
MIDGLEY, supra note 20, at 33-35. 
209 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26. 
210 See Lind, supra note 192, at 142-43, discussing emotions as complexes of feeling 
and cognitive elements. . 
2ll See Donovan, supra note 170. at 149. 
212 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 92. 
213 See id. at 8. 
214 See id. at 84. 
215 ld. at 85. 
2161d. at 8 (quoting ERNEST SCHACHTEL, METAMORPHOSIS 20 (1984». 
217 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 8,11. 
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element to moral theory is that emotions are not universa1.218 Each 
person's emotional response to a situation is different and thus will 
inevitably cause dispute concerning how these responses should be 
incorporated in moral and legal theory. 
It is not, however, necessarily the case that such responses will be 
divergent. If Hume was correct that humans have some innate sense 
of compassion, then emotional responses of different individuals 
should be similar.219 Moreover, even moral and legal theories pre-
sumably founded on utterly rational bases differ as to their efficacy 
and application. Thus, the possibility of dispute is hardly confined to 
a moral theory incorporating emotive aspects. 
There is, then, considerable support for the view that emotion 
should play a part in moral theory. The precise role of emotion in 
such a theory is not within the scope of this article, but at least some 
explanation of the function of emotion in moral theory is in order. 
2. The Role of the Emotive in Moral Theory 
There are a number of uses to which emotions can be put in 
moral theory. Our emotional responses reveal what is of moral value 
to us.220 For example, when we are angered at a slight against some 
person we know, our anger reveals that we value the person 
slighted.221 Our emotion of anger contains not only the emotion itself 
but the moral value we attach to the object of the emotion.222 Simi-
larly, being emotionally upset at the outbreak of war reveals the value 
we place on human life and suffering.223 Our emotions are important 
not only in that they reveal value, but also in what values they reveal-
like the friendship shown by anger from the slight or the value of life 
revealed in feelings toward those suffering in war.224 
218 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 157. One response to the problem of a lack of uni-
versalizability is to say that this does not constitute a defect in a moral theory. See STOCKER, 
supra note 167, at 144-45. I will, nonetheless, assume that it is a defect and address it as 
such. 
219 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 158. 
220 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 56-57. 
221 See id. at 57. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. at 56-57. 
224 See id. at 83. 
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In addition, emotions are morally relevant as motivators to ac-
tion.225 By pushing us to believe and desire certain things, emotions 
drive us to act.226 Acting along with reasoned judgment, emotions give 
us grounds for action.227 They act as instrumental aids in our reason-
ing process, motivating action on behalf of others.228 Emotions move 
us to perform in the interests of those that we value, whether human 
or animal, and this performance can take the form of rescuing the 
afflicted, pushing for legislation to help those in need, or any other 
action in the interest of those we have feelings toward. 
Similarly, emotions aid us in noticing and attending to things that 
are of value to us.229 They guide us in obtaining the knowledge and 
information necessary to take ethical actions. 
Contrary to ordinary thinking, emotions act as aids in rational 
inquiry. Emotion provides the interest in a subject to which we apply 
rational thought.23o This intellectual interest is required for rational 
inquiry to proceed.231 Emotions also guide the course of inquiry232 by 
directing us in certain intellectual directions. Because emotions focus 
our attention on certain issues, they help assure that our rational pro-
cesses lead to determinate outcomes.233 For this reason, emotions 
have been described as "determinate patterns of salience among ob-
jects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies."234 Emo-
tion determines which elements of a problem we focus on and direct 
our attention to, thereby aiding the inquiry and discovery of solu-
tions. Emotions also help us in predicting the behavior of others in 
response to actions.235 Without emotion, rational inquiry would be 
hampered.236 
Along the same lines, emotion is necessary for making evaluative 
judgments.237 In this regard, it has been argued that those who lack 
225 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 83; see also Amelie Oskenberg Rorty, Explaining Emo-
tions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 105 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980); PATRICIA S. 
GREENSPAN, EMOTIONS AND REASON 14 (1988). 
226 See GREENSPAN, supra note 225, at 159. 
227 See id. at 137. 
228 See id. at 152-59, 173. 
229 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 85. 
230 See id. at 100-0 l. 
231 See id. at 101-02. 
232 See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 138-39. 
233 See id. at 14l. 
234/d. at 137. 
235 See id. at 137-38. 
236 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 100-Ol. 
237 See id. at 105-06. 
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emotion are epistemologically disadvantaged in making such judg-
ments.238 Since emotion is necessary to see the values inherent in a 
situation, a lack of emotion will cause a person to overlook and fail to 
apply moral values to a situation.239 Thus, only those who are emo-
tionally engaged can make informed and proper evaluative judg-
ments.240 This is shown by the fact that those who have emotional 
deficiencies have trouble making proper evaluative judgments.241 
Such persons fail because they are affectless or lack feelings appropri-
ate to the circumstances.242 
The connection between emotion and evaluative judgments is so 
strong that some philosophers have categorized emotions as being 
evaluative judgments.243 This theory views emotions as kinds of factu-
ally based beliefs that are partly evaluative.244 For example, fear is the 
belief that some danger 100ms.245 This view, however, may oversimplifY 
emotion as it fails to explain the diversity of emotional phenomena-
for example, emotions that do not seem to be based on full-fledged 
beliefs.246 For this reason, Patricia Greenspan has refined this evalua-
tive judgment view of emotion. She claims that emotions are object-
directed affects whose object is an evaluative proposition-a state-
ment of value.247 Emotions, then, turn out to be compounds of two 
elements: (1) affective states of comfort or discomfort and (2) evalua-
tive propositions.248 Fear would then be a feeling of discomfort and 
the fact (or imagined fact) that danger looms, the latter being the 
evaluative proposition that is the subject of the feeling of discom-
fort.249 In this way, the evaluative proposition need not reach the level 
of being a belief, it need just be a structured evaluation.25o Emotions 
thus can be seen as a broader set of phenomena than is the case if 
emotions always require a belief as their foundation. 
From Greenspan's view we can more clearly see how emotion acts 
with reason in making practical reasoned judgments. To make judg-
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. at 193. 
241 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 108-12. 
242 See id. 
243 GREENSPAN, supra note 225, at 3. 
244 ld. 
2451d. 
246 ld. 
247 ld. at 3-4. 
248 GREENSPAN, supra note 225, at 4. 
2491d. 
250 See id. at 54. 
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ments, one needs the evaluative aspect of emotions.251 Emotions, by 
acting in part to evaluate the world around us, are used in reality test-
ing by humans and are as valuable as rational thought in making 
these evaluations.252 This is not to say that emotions control our proc-
esses of rational thought (the passions are properly in the control of 
reason), but emotions do, at least sometimes, perform the evaluative 
work in our reasoned decisionmaking.253 Due to this connection be-
tween emotion and rational decisionmaking, Stocker takes the view 
that it is simply impossible to separate out the emotional from the ra-
tiona1.254 
Emotion then serves morality in a number of ways. It reveals what 
is of moral portent. It is a moral stimulator. It is a necessary element 
in evaluation of moral issues. It may, in fact, not be separable from 
our rational thought processes at all. 
3. The Role of Emotion in the Law 
If emotion is an aspect of morality, and morality is relevant to the 
law, then the law can and should reflect emotive concerns. Indeed, 
there are many aspects of the law that derive largely from emotive 
concerns. Damages are awarded for emotional distress.255 Such dam-
ages are founded on a sense of compassion for the suffering of others 
even though suffering cannot be easily measured in commercial script 
as can other elements of damage. 
The criminal law provides many emotive features. In providing 
remedies for the sake of victims and society at large we are evincing 
emotion in the law. When we refer to "victim's rights" we speak about 
251 See id. at 175-76. 
252 [d. at 12l. 
253 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 125. 
254 See id. 
255 See David A. Cathcart & Richard K. Stavin, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emo-
tional Distress and Punitive Damages in Employment Cases, CI08 ALI-ABA 493, 547 (1995) 
(stating that damages for violation of Civil Rights Act include compensation for emotional 
distress) ; Ken Feagins, 'Wanted-Diversity: VVhite Heterosexual Males Need not Apply,' 4 
WIDENER]. PUB. L. 1,9 (1994) (noting emotional distress is part of damage awards in dis-
crimination cases); Risa B. Greene, Federal Legislative Proposals for l\IJ.edical Alalpractice Reform: 
Treating the Symptoms or Effecting a Cure?, 4 CORNELL].L. & PUB. POL'y 563, 584 (1995) (not-
ing part of the purpose of tort law is to compensate for emotional distress); Douglas T. 
MiI'acle, Punitive Damages, Jury Discretion and the "Outer Limits" of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Civil Cases, 13 MISS. C. L. REv. 221, 252 (1992) (arguing that the concept of compensatory 
damages has broadened to include damages for emotional trauma). 
1999] A Theory of Animal Rights 35 
our compassion for those who have been victimized.256 When we 
speak of retribution we are venting emotions of anger, indignation, 
and remorse.257 We explicitly recognize the significance of emotion in 
reducing penalities in crimes influenced by overheated emotions or 
mental disturbance.258 In sentencing criminals we sometimes weigh 
compassion not only for the victims, but also for the criminal. We may 
even see emotion play a role in the doctrine of self defense. The in-
tentions of the other party to a conflict, her emotions, may playa role 
in whether a claim of self defense is warranted.259 
Property law, too, has elements of the emotive. Heirlooms, the 
value of which are largely emotional, are specially prized in the law, 
and emotional attachment to goods is an element in determining 
remedies for loss or damage to such goodS.260 Moreover, emotional 
value is taken into consideration in exemption laws.261 Emotional 
256 See Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Dis-
closure, and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 
RUTGERS LJ. 367, 399 (1997); Patrick M. Fahey, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and 
Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REv. 205, 261-62 (1992); Mal"tha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 
UCLAL. REv. 1411, 1416, 1428-29 (1993). 
257 See STOCKER, supra note 167, at 140. See also Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evi-
dence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 399 (1996) 
(showing that retribution in criminal justice is based on venting of anger of the victim's 
loved ones); Belyamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional 
Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 459, 484 (1993) (claiming retribution 
is "an expression of society's anger and moral outrage"); Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition 
of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and Legal Issues SUlTOUnding the Death Penalty, 44 CLEv. ST. 
L. REv. 23, 38 (1996) (noting retribution is not based on reason and logic, but on anger). 
258 See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 312-15 (Tenn. 1987) (finding that killing 
done in passion is not murder in the first degl"ee; it may be manslaughter or second de-
gree murder); Benjamin J. Lantz, Arave v. Creech: A "Cold-Blooded, Pitiless" Disregard for Con-
stitutional Standards, 21 NEW ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 97,124 (1995) (stating 
that manslaughter is killing done in the heat of passion); Richard E. Shugrue, The Second 
Degree Murder Doctrine in Nebraska, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 29, 38-39 (1996) (citing New 
York and Nebraska law concerning reduction in charge of mlU"der to manslaughter if the 
killing was done in the heat of passion); Carol S. Steiker & J QI"dan M. Steiker, Let God Sort 
Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE LJ. 835, 
856 (1992) (citing Model Penal Code provisions providing for reduction in first degree 
murder to second degree murder in the case of killing while impaired by emotional dis-
turbance). 
259 SeeSTOCKER, supra note 167, at 151. 
260 See generall)l Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that 
court may consider sentimental value of goods in determining damages for destruction of 
jewelry). 
261 See In reWilson, 213 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1997); In reDillon, 113 B.R. 46, 50 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1990). 
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value has also been imported to the area of damages for injury or 
death of companion animals.262 
It is clearly false to contend that the law is or should be bereft of 
emotive considerations. Why, then, should our concept of rights be 
devoid of emotive considerations? 
4. v\That Emotions Are Relevant to Morality, Law, and Animal Rights 
Issues? 
If emotion plays a role in moral thought, and if there is a role for 
morality in concepts of legal rights, then it must be recognized that 
there is or should be an emotive aspect to our concepts of rights. Part 
of what we are doing in protecting rightholders is expressing compas-
sion and respect.263 As such, we are recognizing an element of com-
passion in our concept of rights. 
But precisely what types of emotions are relevant to morality, law, 
and animal rights issues? Arthur Schopenhauer argued that the only 
actions that have moral worth are those done exclusively for the 
benefit of another.264 For my action to have moral worth I must actu-
ally suffer the woe of another and be identified with her.265 For 
Schopenhauer, compassion allows for this sacrifice and is the founda-
tion of morality.266 
It is simply and solely this compassion that is the real basis 
for all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness.267 Only 
insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it 
have moral value; and every action resulting from any other 
motive has none. As soon as this compassion is aroused, the 
weal and woe of another are nearest to Illy heart in exactly 
the same way, although not always in the same degree, as 
otherwise only my own are. Hence the difference between 
him and me is no longer absolute.268 
262 See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hasp. Inc., 415 N.YS.2d 182, 183 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 
1979); La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1964). See generally 
Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Faluing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059 (1995). 
263 See DONNELLY, supra note II, at 82. 
264 See SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 57, at 202-03. 
265 See id. at 204. 
266 See id. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
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The primacy of compassion in morality is recognized by Rous-
seau: 
Mandeville well knew that, in spite of all their morality, men 
would never have been better than monsters, had not nature 
bestowed on them a sense of compassion, to aid their rea-
son: but he did not see that from this quality alone flow all 
those social virtues, of which he denied man the possession. 
But what is generosity, clemency, or humanity but compas-
sion applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to mankind in gen-
eral? Even bt:nevolence and friendship are, if we judge 
rightly, only the effects of compassion, constantly set upon a 
particular object: for how is it different to wish that another 
person may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish him 
happy? ... In a word, it is rather in this natural feeling than 
in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of 
that repugnance, which every man would experience in do-
ing evil, even independently of the maxims of education.269 
According to Schopenhauer, compassion makes another's suffer-
ing my motive for action in two ways. First, it prevents me from injur-
ing others.27o Second, it incites me to aid others.271 This latter aspect is 
the highest level of compassion.272 In having this proactive compas-
sion, the barriers between oneself and others are broken down.273 
While I do not subscribe to many of Schopenhuaer's views, I do 
believe that he correctly identifies compassion as the spring from 
which our moral sensibilities flow. And it is this emotion that I believe 
should playa central role in our discussion of the moral and legal is-
sues relating to animal rights. Indeed, there is reason to think that 
compassion plays a special role in the area of animals rights-an even 
more pivotal role than it plays in human moral and human rights is-
sues. 
269 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 74-76 (1993). 
GI'eenspall also notes the significance of what she calls identificatory love, a concept like 
compassion, in motivating and causing moral actions. See GREENSPAN, supra note 225, at 
62-63,74. 
270 See SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 57, at 207-08. 
271 See id. 
272 See id. 
273 See id. at 223-24. 
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B. The Role of Emotion in a Theory of Animal Rights 
If morality is connected to legal rights and emotion is appropri-
ately considered in moral theory, then emotion must play a role in 
how we view rights issues. If emotive concerns are relevant to rights 
issues, they are of particular force in the case of animal rights. From 
Descartes' likening of animals' howls of pain to the screeching of ma-
chinery, to modern vivisection, our culture has trained us that feelings 
and emotions are not to be squandered on nonhuman animals. There 
is no need for concern for them since they do not feel pain or suffer-
ing, at least not in the way that we do. There is no reason to feel for 
them. Feelings are reserved for humans and specifically only those 
close to us-family and friends. 
We know that the Cartesian view is myth. Animals do experience 
pain.274 Animal pain physiology, though differing in certain ways from 
that of humans, operates in largely the same way as does human pain 
physiology.275 Not just pain, but anxiety and other forms of suffering 
exist in animals.276 Contrary to the Cartesian world view, there is good 
reason to have compassion for animals since they have the kind of 
suffering and pain that are appropriately objects of this emotion. To 
break the hold of Cartesian theory, it is of particular importance in 
our consideration of animal rights issues to, as we naturally do with 
respect to humans, fittingly consider our emotions. That it is cultur-
ally accepted to do so with humans, but not necessarily so with ani-
mals, makes its import in the latter case greater than in the former. 
To the extent that the interests of animals are considered in the 
composite view of rights that I have described, these interests will in-
clude animal pain, anxiety, and the like. To evaluate these matters is, 
at least in part, to have feelings of compassion. Thus, to the extent 
that interests are part of the reason that we grant rights to an entity, 
the only way that these interests may be properly gauged is through 
our own emotional experiences and evaluations. 
Animals cannot speak for themselves. They cannot communicate 
to us through our familiar means of language. The only way that 
communication can occur is through observations of animal behavior. 
274 See TOM REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN 6--27 (1982); BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE 
UNHEEDED CRY: ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ANIMAL PAIN AND SCIENCE 107-201 (1989); 
SINGER, supra note 8, at 9-13,15. 
275 See ROLLIN, supra note 274, at 64-66; see also ANDREW ROWAN, OF MICE, MODELS 
AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANIMAL RESEARCH 77-79 (1984). 
276 See ROWAN, supra note 275, at 82-83. 
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As a result, to determine the needs and interests of animals it is neces-
sary to reason by use of analogy from our own experiences. 
If we assume that another being has interests, and ask 
whether this imposes duties upon us, we must resort to rea-
soning by analogy. We infer certain inner processes from 
physical manifestations, which we know to be associated with 
such processes in ourselves. Such reasoning by analogy may 
involve greater or lesser difficulties according to the nature 
of the given case, but this much is certain: either we cannot 
apply it at all or we must always apply it. Those who advance 
the argument in question [that we cannot know of an ani-
mal's interests] must, then, in order to be consistent, assert 
that men have no more rights than animals-neither would 
have any rights at al1.277 
As a part of this reasoning by analogy we must consider the inner 
processes of animals by analogy to our own. Moreover, since animals 
cannot communicate in our language, analysis by analogy to our feel-
ings is even more crucial in the case of animals than in the case of 
humans. Thus, emotional responses are a necessary part of evaluation 
of the interests of animals and rights that may arise from these inter-
ests. 
How might emotional considerations affect our analysis of animal 
rights issues? While it is not intended here to present in detail pre-
cisely what a theory of animal rights would look like if it appropriately 
considered emotional aspects of the issue, a few ways in which emo-
tion might impact the analysis of animal rights issues can be outlined. 
On the issue of whether it is fitting to attribute rights to animals in 
order to protect them from ill treatment, we might ask whether we 
feel compassion for their suffering. We might ask whether we feel at-
tachment to them, whether we feel a sense of kinship to them, 
whether we feel a sense of awe at their resilience, and whether these 
feelings give us a reason to grant them rights. These feelings, none of 
which put us across an impenetrable gulf from reason, can be seen as 
elements counting in the analysis of whether rights ought to be ac-
corded to animals. 
If we conclude that animals should be accorded rights, as I be-
lieve they should, what role might emotion play in determining what 
rights we grant to animals? Our primary emotional response to ani-
277 NELSON, supra note 52, at 138. 
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mals is to feel compassion for their suffering. As Jeremy Bentham 
stated, "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but 
Can they suffer?"278 Our emotional response to animal suffering must 
be considered in determining whether a practice violates an animal 
right. Given that most, if not all of us feel compassion for animals in 
laboratories or factory farms, this response is a strong reason support-
ing the abolition of such practices as a matter of right. 
Similarly, our feeling of compassion toward those with restric-
tions on their liberty and freedom would count against practices en-
gaged in by circuses, zoos, and other institutions that confine animals. 
These same feelings may lead us to broader environmental and eco-
logical issues bearing on the liberty and freedom of not only wild 
animals, but ourselves. 
To achieve the result of applying appropriate emotional re-
sponses to questions concerning animal rights requires unifYing our 
rational and emotional natures. One way to do this is to actually expe-
rience the conditions that cause human compassion for animals.279 To 
experience what is done in animal experiments, in the slaughter-
house, or on the factory farm will allow us both to feel and to apply 
our capacity of reason to real conditions. If we consider our rational 
nature and appropriate feelings about animal issues, our emotional 
reactions suggest according rights to animals. Such considerations will 
also help guide us in determining the content of those rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Western thought makes us skeptical about the application of 
emotion in morality and the law. As a result, emotional responses to 
the plight of animals and others is thought to play no role in animal 
or human rights issues. 
Our theories of rights are modeled on Western scientific reduc-
tionism. They are examples of attempts to find a "unified theory" of 
rights; we seek in morality and law to find something that physics 
cannot. Rights are thought to be grounded in interests or in some 
core element of an overarching rational moral theory. Or rights are 
just remedies that can be empirically discovered in the pages of a law 
book and the institutions that enforce its precepts. 
278 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 381 n.330 (1961). 
279 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 27; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 262-63. 
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In reality, rights are not so simple or easily accessed. Rights are 
actually composites of many elements. When we say that "X has a 
right to Y' we are saying many things. We are saying that X has an in-
terest in Y, that certain duties are owed to X with regard to Y, that 
there is a moral imperative behind X's right, and that X is to have a 
remedy if she is denied Y, and so on. 
What we are also saying is that we have some emotional response 
to X in relation to Y, that we feel that it should morally and legally be 
the case that X is protected in regard to Y But this emotive aspect is 
generally ignored in moral and legal theory. As has been shown, how-
ever, there is a role for emotion in moral theory, and if we believe that 
moral theory is relevant to legal theory, then emotion must play some 
role in the construction of rights. 
I do not suggest that we abandon reason in considering issues of 
animal rights. Rather, we should consider emotion as a part of our 
analysis of animal rights issues. Indeed, because of our history of 
staunchly denying the relevance of feelings toward animals, and due 
to our inability to communicate with animals and determine their 
needs and interests, the emotional aspect of our relationships with 
animals is more important in determining appropriate treatment of 
them than in the case of humans. If we recognize the emotional as-
pects of our nature, and take a balanced and unified approach to ap-
plying our rational and emotive natures to issues of animal rights, we 
will have a more realistic and honest approach to animal rights issues. 

